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AUTOMOBILES - INSURANCE - THE REQUIREMENTS
OF NORTH DAKOTA'S FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
LAWS ARE APPLICABLE TO ALL AUTOMOBILE
LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES

Norval Fliflet, while driving a Plymouth Fury III automobile
owned by his brother-in-law, Daniel Bye, was involved in a car
accident with a vehicle owned and driven by Steven Richard.1 At
the time of the accident an insurance policy, issued by State Farm
Insurance to Merlin Lende, existed on the Fury 111.2 State Farm
was unaware, until after the accident occurred, that Lende did not
own the car. 3 After learning that Lende was not the owner of the
Fury III, State Farm rescinded the insurance policy and denied
liability coverage for the accident. 4 Richard commenced a lawsuit
against Fliflet and Bye for damages that he sustained in the
accident. 5 Fliflet subsequently served a third party summons and
complaint on State Farm, which again denied liability and stated
that the insurance policy had been rescinded on the basis of Lende's
misrepresentation of ownership. 6 The district court determined
1. Richard v. Fliflet, 370 N.W.2d 528, 529 (N.D. 1985).
2. Id. In applying for the insurance policy, Lende stated that he owned the Fury III. Id. The
application was falsified by Lende because of Daniel Bye's previous conviction for driving while
intoxicated. Id. at 536 (VandeWalle, J., dissenting). The falsification was an effort to avoid paying
the higher insurance premiums that would result if the insurance company were aware of Bye's
previous conviction. Id.
3. Id. at 529.
4. Id. State Farm denied liability on the basis that the insurance contract had been rescinded
because of Lende's misrepresentation of ownership and concealment of a material fact. Id. at 530.
State Farm returned to Mr. Lende the entire premium he had paid. Id. at 529.
5. Id. Richard commenced the action in the East Central ludicial Court of Cass County. Id. at
528. He sought damages of $2,000. Id. at 529. At the time of the accident, Fliflet had
an insurance policy with Dairyland Insurance Company covering his 1970 Plymouth. Id. at 529-30.
The policy required Dairyland to provide Fliflet with legal assistance although the insured 1970
Plymouth was not involved in the accident. Id. at 530.
6. ld. Fliflet claimed a right of indemnification by virtue of State Farm's obligations under the
policy issued to Mr. Lende. Id. The action between Fliflet and Richard was settled for $1,100. Id.
The parties agreed that whichever insurance company was obligated to provide coverage would pay
Richard. Id. Fliflet's third party action against State Farm was submitted to the district court on
stipulated facts. Id. The district court dismissed the action, and Fliflet appealed. Id.
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that State Farm had properly rescinded the policy because of
Lende's misrepresentation of a material fact and because the policy
was not issued pursuant to North Dakota's financial responsibility
laws. 7 The dispositive issue on appeal was whether State Farm
could, on the basis of Lende's misrepresentation in his insurance
application, rescind the policy after the occurrence of the accident. 8
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that subsection 39-16.111(6) (a) of the North Dakota Century Code, which prohibits an
insurer from rescinding an insurance policy after the occurrence of
injury or damage, applies to all voluntarily purchased motor
vehicle liability insurance policies, provided the policies afford
substantially the same coverage as required by North Dakota's
financial responsibility laws. 9 Therefore, the court concluded that
State Farm could not, after the accident, properly rescind the policy
it had issued to Lende covering the Plymouth Fury 111.10 Richardv.
Fliflet, 370 N.W.2d 528 (N.D. 1985).
The problem of compensating victims of automobile traffic
accidents has been the subject of public concern for over fifty
years." Drivers have partially solved the problem by voluntarily
obtaining automobile liability insurance. 12 An insured driver's
liability insurance compensates the victims of any accident
involving the insured.' 3 Although voluntarily purchased liability
policies have mitigated the problem of compensation, the issue has
7. Id. Chapter 39-16.1 of the North Dakota Century Code contains a portion of North Dakota's
financial responsibility law. See N.D. CENT. CODE $ 39-16.1-11 (Supp. 1985). Subsection 39-16.11I(6Xa) of the North Dakota Century Code provides as follows:
6. Every motor vehicle liability policy shall be subject to the following provisions
which need not be contained therein:
a. The liability of the insurance carrier with respect to the insurance required by
this chapter shall become absolute whenever injury or damage covered by said
motor vehicle liability policy occurs; said policy may not be canceled or
annulled as to such liability by any agreement between the insurance carrier
and the insured after the occurrence of the injury or damage; no statement
made by the insured or on his behalf and no violation of said policy shall defeat
or void said policy.
Id. $ 39-16.1-1 1(6Xa) (Supp. 1985).
8. Fliflkt, 370 N.W.2d at 530.
9. Id. at 535.

10. Id.
11. See Laufer, InsuranceAgainst Lack of Insurance?A Dissentfrom the UninsuredMotorist Endorsement,

1969 DusE L.J. 227, 230-31 (a discussion of early responses to the problem of compensating victims
of accidents involving uninsured motorists).
12. Id. at 227. In 1969, an estimated 85% of the passenger automobiles in the United States
were covered by liability insurance. Id.
13. See 12 G. COUCH, R. ANDERSON & M. RHODES, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW S 45:1, at
219 (2d rev. ed. 1981) [hereinafter Coucm]. Because of the disastrous effects that are often the result
of motor vehicle accidents, policies are liberally construed to provide coverage whenever reasonably
possible. Id.; see Travelers Mut. Casualty Co. v. Rector, 138 F.2d 396, 402 (8th Cir. 1943) (policy to
be construed most favorably for the insured); Howard v. American Serv. Mist. Ins. Co., 151 So. 2d

682, 686 (Fla. 1963) (same).
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remained a matter of great public concern. 14 In response to this
concern, state legislatures have enacted statutes designed to
regulate liability insurance. 1 5 Compulsory insurance, 16 no-fault
insurance, 7 and financial responsibility laws"' are the most widely
enacted legislative schemes designed to assure that automobile
drivers are insured. 19
The enactment of financial responsibility laws was the first
legislative attempt to provide adequate compensation to victims of
automobile accidents. 20 Financial responsibility acts have three
basic objectives: (1) to prevent or decrease accidents by eliminating
or segregating the bad driver; (2) to increase the number of insured
drivers and compel the poor driver to obtain insurance; and (3) to
satisfy more claims arising out of automobile accidents. 2 1 Although
the financial responsibility laws adopted by various states differ in
scope and applicability, all attempt to provide compensation to
22
innocent victims of financially irresponsible drivers.
14. See, e.g., Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 332 N.W.2d 160,
165-66 (Minn. 1983) (public policy dictates a liberal construction of statutes affording protection to

traffic accident victims); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Watkins, 209 So. 2d 630, 634 (Miss. 1968)
(legislative policy is to protect the public and provide insurance coverage when persons are injured
on the state's highways); Gross v. Joecks, 72 Wis. 2d 583, 590, 241 N.W.2d 727, 730 (1976)
(financial responsibility laws are intended to protect traffic accident victims from financial hardship).
15. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE SS 26.1-25-01 to -05 (Supp. 1985) (regulation of insurance
rates).
16. See generally 12A CoucH, supra note 13, 5 45:679. States with compulsory liability insurance
laws require all motorists to carry liability insurance before operating a motor vehicle on the public
highways of the state. Id.; see, e.g., COL. REV. STAT. S10-4-705 (1973 & Supp. 1985); N.Y. VEH. &
TRAP. LAw S 312 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1986); N.D. CENr. Coo S 39-08-20 (Supp. 1985).
17. See generally 12A COUCH, supra note 13, S 45:661. The purpose of no-fault insurance is to
compensate all victims of traffic accidents regardless of fault. Id. at 245. Statutes generally provide
compensation for the victim's out-of-pocket medical expenses and loss of earnings as the expenses
accrue. Id. Thus the victim is compensated without having to pursue a tort claim. Id. As of 1981,
twenty-four states had adopted some form of a no-fault automobile insurance statute. Id.; see, e.g.,
COL. REV. STAT. § 10-4-701 to -723 (1973 & Supp. 1985); N.Y. INS. LAw 5 5101 to 5108 (McKinney
1985); N.D. CENT. CODE S26.1-41-06 (Supp. 1985).
18. See generally 12A COUCH, supra note 13, 5 45:721. Financial responsibility laws are designed
to discourage careless driving and mitigate its consequences by requiring proof of financial
responsibility prior to the granting of a driver's license. Id. at 351. Financial responsibility laws also
authorize revocation of a driver's license for failure to provide proof of financial responsibility after
the occurrence of an accident. Id. Financial responsibility laws are distinguishable from compulsory
liability insurance laws, because financial responsibility laws are generally applicable only after a
person has been involved in an accident. Id. S 45-679, at 315; see, e.g., COL. REV. STAT. SS 42-7-101
to 42-7-510 (1984 & Supp. 1985); N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAw §5 330 to 368 (McKinney 1970 & Supp.
1986), N.D. CENT. CODE chs. 39-16, 39-16.1 (1980 & Supo. 1985).
19. See 12A COUCH, supra note 13, S45:661, 45:721.
20. Id. S 45:721, ai 361. See generally Legislation, A Survey of Financial Responsibility Laws and
Compensation of Traffc Victims: A Proposalfor Rform, 21 VANO. L. REV. 1050 (1968) (discussing the
operation and effect of financial responsibility laws and suggestions for reform).
21. Legislation, supra note 20, at 1051. The author states that the insurance industry vigorously

promoted the enactment of financial responsibility laws in an effort to avoid widespread enactment of
compulsory insurance laws. Id. Insurance companies feared that compulsory insurance laws would
result in excessive government control of the industry, inadequate fixed policy fees, and the inability
of insurance carriers to exclude bad risk drivers from coverage. See Grad, Recent Developments in
Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 300, 313-14 (1950).
22. Legislation, supra note 20, at 1052-54. One author has stated that "ft]he purpose of a

financial responsibility act is to furnish compensation for innnocent persons and members of the
general public who are injured by the negligent operation of automobiles, and to protect them from
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In North Dakota a driver of a motor vehicle that is involved in
an accident which results in death or damages exceeding six
hundred dollars must report the accident to law enforcement
authorities. 23 The accident reports are forwarded to the State
Highway Commissioner who determines whether the persons
involved in the accident will be required to post security as proof of
their ability to respond to any damages for which they may be
found liable.2 4 The provisions of section 39-16-05 of the North
Dakota Century Code require individuals involved in reportable
accidents to either post security or purchase a liability insurance
2
policy that provides coverage equivalent to the required security. 1
The policy must be certified as proof of financial responsibility, and
it must satisfy the financial responsibility requirements contained
in chapter 39-16.1 of the North Dakota Century Code. 26 Section
39-16-05 is not applicable, however, to a person who qualifies for a
statutory exemption, such as the existence of an acceptable liability
insurance policy at the time of a vehicular accident. 27 Failure to
financially irresponsibile persons." 12A CoucH,,supra note 13, S 45:723, at 365-66 (footnote
omitted). A report prepared by the North Dakota Legislative Research Committee stated that
financial responsibility laws were enacted for the purpose of compensating innocent victims of traffic
accidents. NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH .COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE. LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLY OF 1967, at 93 (1967).
23. N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-08-09 (Supp. 1985).
24. Id. 5 39-16-05(1). Subsection 1 of § 39-16-05 of the North Dakota Century Code gives the
State Highway Commissioner the authority to suspend the license of drivers involved in reportable
accidents. Id. The subsection provides, in relevant part, as follows:
The commissioner . . . shall suspend the license of each driver of each vehicle in any
manner involved in the accident .... However, ifa driver ... involved in the accident
purchases an insurance policy with at least the amount of coverage required by this
section, and files proof and satisfies financial responsibility requirements thereof with
the commissioner, that driver may retain the license or privilege until the driver has
accepted responsibility for the accident or agreed to a settlement of claims arising from
the accident or until a court of this state has determined that the driver was negligent
or responsible for the accident in whole or in part. If the driver is found negligent or
responsible for the accident, in whole or in part, the license or privilege must be
suspended and will not be returned until the driver complies with this chapter.
Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. Sections 39-16-09 and 39-16-10 of the North Dakota Century Code govern the amount
and procedure for the deposit of a security that must be posted to satisfy proof of financial
responsibility. Id. 5§ 39-16-09, -10 (1980). Sections 39-16.1-09 and 39-16.1-10 set forth the
procedure for certification of an insurance policy to prove financial responsibility. Id. 5S 39-16.1-09.
-10; see also id. S 39-16.1-11 (Supp. 1985) (describing the provisions that a certified policy must
.contain).
27. Id. § 39-16-05(2) (Supp. 1985). Subsection 2 of S 39-16-05 exempts various people from the
financial responsibility requirements. Id. The subsection provides as follows:
2.

This section does not apply...
a. To a driver, if the driver is the owner of the motor vehicle involved in the
accident and had in effect at the time of such accident an automobile liability
policy with respect to the motor vehicle involved in the accident, affording
substantially the same coverage as is required for proof of financial
responsibility under chapter 39-16.1.
b. To a driver, if not the owner of the motor vehicle, if there was in effect at the
time of the accident an automobile liability policy or bond with respect to the
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post the required security, to purchase a liability insurance policy
that satisfies the financial responsibility requirements, or to qualify
exemptions results in suspension of an
under one of the statutory
28
individual's license.
Although an automobile liability insurance policy is normally
deemed to be for the insured's protection, 29 a policy certified as
proof of financial responsibility also protects third parties.3 0
Financial responsibility laws require certified policies to contain an
omnibus clause that extends coverage under the policy to persons
using the insured vehicle with the express or implied consent of the
owner. 3' Financial responsibility laws also operate to make the
insurer's liability absolute upon the occurrence of injury or
damage. 32 Therefore, if an insurance policy has been issued to
satisfy a state's financial responsibility laws, an insurer may not
driver's operation of the motor vehicle, affording substantially the same
coverage as required for proof of financial responsibility under chapter 39-16.1.
c. To a driver, if the liability of the driver for damages resulting from the accident
is, in the judgment of the commissioner, covered by any other form of liability
insurance policy or bond or certificate of self-insurance under section 39-16-32.
Id.; cf. Legislation, supra note 20, at 1053 (discussing the operation of financial responsibility laws
and determining that the majority of motorists satisfy the security requirement by obtaining an
automobile liability policy).
28. N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-16-05(1) (Supp. 1985). For the text of section 39-16-05(1), see supra
note 24.
29. See 12 CoucH, supra note 13, S 45:7.
105 P.2d 259, 263-64 (1940) (financial
30. See Utilities Ins. Co. v. Potter, 188 Okla. 145, -,
responsibility laws are for the protection of the general public and should be construed most strongly
against the insurer).
31. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE 5 39-16.1-11(2)(b) (Supp. 1985). Subsections 2 and 3 of S 3916.1-11 of the North Dakota Century Code contain a standard omnibus clause. The subsections
provide, in relevant part, as follows:
2.

3.

Such owner's policy of liability insurance:
b. Shall insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using
such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of
such named insured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such motor vehicles ....
Such operator's policy of liability insurance shall insure the person named as
insured therein against loss from the liability imposed upon him by law for
damages arising out of the use by him of any motor vehicle, either unlimited, or
limited by excluding certain classes or types of motor vehicles ....

Id.
32. See, e.g., id. S 39-16.1-1l(6)(a). Subsection 6 of 5 39-16.1-11 of the North Dakota Century
Code provides, in relevant part, as follows:
6. Every motor vehicle liability policy shall be subject to the following provisions
which need not be contained therein:
a. The liability of the insurance carrier with respect to the insurance required by
this chapter shall become absolute whenever injury or damage covered by said
motor vehicle liability policy occurs; said policy may not be canceled or
annulled as to such liability by any agreement between the insurance carrier
and the insured after the occurrence of the injury or damage; no statement
made by the insured or on his behalf and no violation of said policy shall defeat
or void said policy.
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rely on standard policy defenses to cancel the policy after the
occurrence of an accident that causes injury or damage."
Litigation concerning financial responsibility laws has
generally involved the issue of whether the coverage requirements
of the laws apply only to policies certified as proof of financial
responsibility, or whether they also apply to voluntarily purchased
3
liability insurance policies. 3 4 Authorities conflict on this issue.
The majority of states has determined that the financial
responsibility laws apply only to policies certified as proof of
36
financial responsibility.
The majority viewpoint is supported by two rationales. The
first rationale can be inferred directly from the statutory language
of North Dakota's Financial Responsibility Act.3 7 Subsection 3916.1-11(1) of the North Dakota Century Code defines a "motor
vehicle liability policy" as a policy certified as proof of financial
responsibility. 38 The policy coverage requirements of the financial
responsibility laws are applicable only to a "motor vehicle liability
policy." '39 Subsection 39-16-05(2) uses a different term "automobile liability policy" - to refer to policies purchased
voluntarily to avoid the sanctions of subsection 39-16-05(1).40 It has
33. See id. See generally 12 COUCH, supra note 13, 5§ 44A:1-136 (discussion of standard policy
defenses). The advent of financial responsibility laws, with their strong policy of protecting innocent
.traffic accident victims from financial hardship, has caused courts to stress the compensatory feature
of liability insurance. Legislation, supra note 20, at 1057. The courts have sought to give the injured
person rights under the insurance contract. Id. These rights are derived from statute and public
policy and are independent from the insured's rights. Id. As a result, many of the traditional policy
defenses, such as fraud or misrepresentation by the insured, breach of warranty, and violation of a
policy provision, have been affected. Id.
34. See Note, CaliforniaFinancialResponsibility Laws - A .ludicialInterpretation, 20 HASTINGs L.
1273, 1277-89 (1969) (discussing California case law dealing with that state's financial responsibility
laws and their applicability to voluntarily purchased liability policies). The specific issue in most
cases has been whether the omnibus coverage provision of the financial responsibility laws, which
prohibits driver or beneficiary exclusions, applies to voluntarily purchased policies. See, e.g.,
Wildman v. Government Employees' Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31, 39, 307 P.2d 359, 364 (1957)
(invalidating exclusionary clause because contrary to omnibus provision). For the text of North
Dakota's omnibus statute, see supra note 31.

35. Compare Lewis v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 449 P.2d 679, 681 (Mont. 1969) (provisions of the
state's financial responsibility law are not applicable to voluntarily purchased liability insurance

policies) withJenkins v. Mayflower Ins. Exch., 93 Ariz. 287, 291, 380 P.2d 145, 148 (1963) (omnibus
clause provided for by state's financial responsibility laws is a part of every motor vehicle liability
policy).
36. See, e.g., Novak v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 293 N.W.2d 452, 454 (S.D. 1980)
(household exclusion clause violates financial responsibility statute only if policy had been certifed as
proof of financial responsibility).
37. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE 5 39-16.1-11(1) (Supp. 1985) (defining "motor vehicle liability
policy") with id. § 39-16- 05(2) (referring to "automobile liability policy"). For the text of § 39-1605(2), see supra note 27.
38. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-16.1-11.(1) (Supp. 1985). Section 39-16.1-11 defines the term
"motor vehicle liability policy" as follows: "A 'motor vehicle liability policy' . . . means an owner's
or an operator's policy of liability insurance, certified .
as proof of financial responsibility ......
Id.
39. Seeid. §39-16.1-11.
40. See id.§ 39-16-05 (Supp. 1985). The sanctions of S 39-16-05(1) are inapplicable when the
motor vehicle or operator involved in the accident was covered by an "automobile liability policy."
Id. § 39-16-05(2). For the text of § 39-16-05(1), see supra note 24. For the text of 5 39-16-05(2), see
supra note 27.
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been argued that the legislature contemplated two different types of
liability policies, as evidenced by the two terms used in the
statutes. 4 1 Thus, arguably the coverage requirements of the
financial responsibility laws are applicable only to policies certified
as proof of financial responsibility, and not to voluntarily
4 2
purchased policies.
A minority of states rejects the above approach and argues that
it allows artful distinctions between the statutory terms to defeat the
purpose of the financial responsibility laws. 43 These states have
determined that certain provisions of the financial responsibility
laws are applicable to all liability insurance policies, regardless of
44
certification.
The second, and more prevalent, rationale offered for refusing
to apply financial responsibility laws to voluntarily purchased
liability insurance policies is the existence of modified conformity
clauses 45 in most insurance policies.4 6 Originally, the typical
conformity clause in a liability insurance policy stated that the
policy would conform to any applicable financial responsibility
law. 47 In 1955 most insurance companies modified their liability
41. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Walker, 329 P.2d 852 (Okla. 1958). In
determining that the phrase "automobile liability policy" has a different meaning than the phrase
"motor vehicle liability policy," the court stated as follows:
From a careful analysis of the act, it is apparent that the lawmaking body
contemplated two types of insurance policy for the two classes of operators. One is an
The other is a "motor vehicle
"automobile liability policy" voluntarily carried ....
liability policy" which an operator is compelled to carry in order to terminate the
suspension of his license ....
Id.
42. See, e.g., Hoosier Casualty Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214, 232 (N.D. Iowa 1952) (voluntarily
purchased policy is not a "motor vehicle liability policy," and thus is not subject to financial
responsibility provisions); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Walker, 329 P.2d 852, 856 (Okla.
1958) (same).
43. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Mayflower Ins. Exch., 93 Ariz. 287, 290-91, 380 P.2d 145, 147-48
(1963) (refusing to make a distinction between the phrases "automobile liability policy" and "motor
vehicle liability policy"); Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 N.W.2d 870, 881, 882-83
(N.D. 1975) (adopting the minority view of refusing to distinguish between the two phrases); see also
Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. General Casualty Co., 200 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Iowa 1972)
(LeGrand, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion rested on delicate and tenuous
distinctions between the two phrases).
44. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Mayflower Ins. Exch., 93 Ariz. 287, 291, 380 P.2d 145, 148 (1963)
(questioning the validity of an exclusion in an insurance policy in light of the omnibus clause
contained in the state's financial responsibility laws); Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
236 N.W.2d 870, 883 (N.D. 1975) (citingJenkins for the proposition that the legislature intended to
make no distinction between "automobile liability policy" and "motor vehicle liability policy").
45. See I CoucH, supra note 13, at S 13:7. A conformity clause operates to amend the policy to
conform to any applicable statutes. Id.
46. SeeComment, The New Kansas Motor Vehicle Sajety Responsibility Act, 6 U. KAN. L. REV. 358,
369-70 (1958) (discussing court interpretation of the conformity clause).
47. Id. at 369; see, e.g., Howard v. American Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 151 So. 2d 682, 683 & n.l
(Fla. App. 1963). The conformity clause at issue in Howardstated, in part, as follows:
Such insurance as is afforded by this policy for bodily injury liability or property
damage liability shall comply with the provisions of the motor vehicle financial
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policies' conformity clauses. 48 The modified clauses stated that the
policy was to conform to applicable financial responsibility laws
only when the policy had previously been certified as proof of
financial responsibility. 9 The modification was an attempt by
insurance companies to have the clause conform only those policies
0
that had actually been certified as proof of financial responsibility. 5
After the modification, much litigation continued concerning
whether the coverage requirements of the financial responsibility
laws applied to voluntarily purchased liability policies that
contained the modified conformity clause.5 1 The majority view is
that the financial responsibility laws apply only to policies actually
5 2
certified as proof of financial responsibility.
The minority view is that a conformity clause operates to
conform the policy to the minimum policy coverage requirements
responsibility law of any state or province which shall be applicable with respect to any
such liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile
during the policy period, to the extent of the coverage and limits of liability required
by such law ....

Id. at 683 n. 1. The court determined that if the clause were to have meaning, it was necessary to
construe it as operating to conform the policy to the state's financial responsibility laws. Id. at 686.
The court relied on the general rule of construction of resolving ambiguities in an insurance policy
against the insurer. See id.

48. Risjord & Austin, The FinancialResponsibility Condition of the Automobile Liability Policy, 25 U.
KAN. City L. REv. 83, 83 (1957).

49. See id. The typical clause now states, in part, as follows:
When this policy is certified as proof of financial responsibility for the future under the
provisions of the motor vehicle financial responsibility law of any state or province,
such insurance as is afforded by this policy for bodily injury liability or for property
damage liability shall comply with the provisions of such law which shall be applicable
with respect to any such liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of
the automobile during the policy period, to the extent of the coverage and limits of
liability stated in this policy.
Id. at 83 n.2.
50. Id. at 83. Risjord and Austin stated that the revision of the typical conformity clause was an
attempt by the drafters to preclude further misinterpretations of the clause by the courts. Id. Risjord
and Austin note that "[tlhe revision is significant, not because it changes the policy coverage, but
because it is a definite attempt by the policy drafters to spell out precisely what the underwriters have

always intended .... " Id.
The Florida Supreme Court, in 1963, interpreted the pre-1955 clause as operating to conform
the policy to the financial responsibility laws regardless of whether the policy had previously been
certified. See Howard v. American Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 151 So. 2d 682, 686 (Fla. App. 1963). For a
brief discussion of Howard, see supra note 47. In 1966, however, the Florida Supreme Court held that

a modified conformity clause operated to conform the policy to.the state's financial responsibility
laws only when the policy had been previously certified as proof of financial responsibility. See LynchDavidson Motors v. Griffin, 182 So. 2d 7, 9-10 (Fla. 1966).
51. Compare Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 N.W.2d 870, 885 (N.D. 1975)

(financial responsibility laws are applicable to voluntarily purchased policy containing modified
conformity clause) with Novak v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 293 N.W.2d 452 (S.D. 1980)

(financial responsibility statute not applicable to insurance contract with modified conformity
clause).
52. See Novak v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 293 N.W.2d 452, 454 (S.D. 1980). In Novak
the court determined that only those policies that had actually been certified as proof of financial
responsibility need satisfy the requirements of the financial responsibility laws. Id. Since the policy at
issue had not been certified, it was not required to follow the provisions of the state's financial
responsibility laws, even though it contained the typical conformity clause. Id.; see also Lewis v. MidCentury Ins. Co., 449 P.2d 679, 681 (Mont. 1968) (provisions of the state's financial responsibility
laws applied only to policies actually certified as proof of financial responsibility).
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of the financial responsibility laws. 53 The requirements are
incorporated into the policy to determine whether coverage will be
extended to the insured. 54 Under the minority view, therefore,
financial responsibility coverage requirements apply to a
voluntarily purchased policy containing the clause although the
policy was not certified as proof of financial responsibility. 55 The
courts adhering to this view have relied to a large extent on the
public policy expressed in the financial responsibility laws; namely,
56
to provide compensation to victims of automobile accidents.
In Wildman v. Government Employees' Insurance Co. , 5 the
California Supreme Court articulated the minority view. 58 At issue
was the validity of an exclusion clause contained in an automobile
liability insurance policy. 59 The insured argued that the exclusion
clause was invalid because it violated the provisions of California's
financial responsibility laws. 60 The insurance policy contained the
53. See, e.g., Hughes, 236 N.W.2d 870, 885. In Hughes the North Dakota Supreme Court

determined that a conformity clause operated to conform the policy to North Dakota's financial
responsibility laws regardless of whether the policy was certified. See id. The court stated that the
"clause warrants to the policyholder that, under certain conditions, the policy is in compliance with
and conforms to, the requirements of a state's financial responsibility law." Id. at 877.
54. See id. at 885. The financial responsibility provisions most commonly incorporated into
uncertified policies are the omnibus coverage provision and the absolute liability provision. See, e.g.,
id. at 884 (omnibus provision); Shockley v. Sallows, 615 F.2d 233, 237 (5th Cir.)
(absolute liability provision), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980). For the text of North Dakota's
omnibus provision, see supra note 31. For the text of North Dakota's absolute liability provision, see
55. See Hughes, 236 N.W.2d at 885; see also Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Andersen, 102 Ariz. 515,
, 433 P.2d 963, 965 (1967) (applying the omnibus clause of the financial responsibility laws to a
voluntarily puchased liability policy); Wildman v. Government Employees' Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31,
39, 307 P.2d 359, 364 (1957) (determining a family exclusion clause contained in a voluntarily
purchased policy to be invalid because contrary to the state's public policy as expressed in its
financial responsibility laws). For a discussion of the Wildman decision, see infra notes 57-65 and
accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Wildman v. Government Employees' Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31, 39, 307 P.2d 359,
364 (1957). The Supreme Court of California, in Wildman, determined that the basic purpose behind
the legislature's enactment of financial responsibility laws was to protect innocent victims of motor
vehicle accidents from financial disaster. See id. The North Dakota Supreme Court, in Hughes v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 N.W.2d 870 (N.D. 1975), followed the Wildman decision and
determined that the public policy of protecting innocent victims of accidents from financial disaster
dictates that the policy in question must conform to the omnibus coverage requirement of the
financial responsibility laws. Id. at 884.
57. 48 Cal. 2d 31, 307 P.2d 359 (1957).
58. Wildman v. Government Employees' Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31, 307 P.2d 359 (1957). For a
discussion of the minority view regarding the effect of a conformity clause, see supra notes 53-56.and
accompanying text. In Wildman the Supreme Court of California also determined that the conformity
clause was ambiguous and construed the ambiguity against the insurer. 48 Cal. 2d at 35-37, 307
P.2d at 361-63.
59. 48 Cal. 2d at 34, 307 P.2d at 361. The Bonifacios had voluntarily purchased a liability
insurance policy covering their Cadillac. Id. The policy contained an exclusion clause that restricted
coverage to the insured and members of his immediate family whenever the insured vehicle was
driven by a non family member. Id. A friend of the Bonifacios was driving the Cadillac when an
accident occurred resulting in injuries to Mrs. Wildman and damage to Mr. and Mrs. Wildman's
property. Id. at 33, 307 P.2d at 360. The insurance company denied coverage on the basis of the
exclusion clause. Id. at 34, 307 P.2d at 361.
60. See id. at 37, 307 P.2d at 363; 1937 Cal. Stat. ch. 840, S 5, at 2356 (stating coverage
requirements applicable to all motor vehicle liability policies) (current version at CAL. VEH. CODE $$,
16450, 16451 (West 1971) (restricting requirements to policies certified as proof of financial
responsibility).
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standard pre-1955 conformity clause. 61 The court, relying on
public policy considerations 62 and on the conformity clause,63
determined that the insurance company's construction of the
exclusion clause would violate the omnibus provision of the state's
financial responsibility laws. 64 The court determined that the

be a part of every liability
legislature intended the provision to 65
California.
in
issued
insurance policy
In 1975 the North Dakota Supreme Court was faced with the
question of whether the omnibus provisions of the financial
responsibility laws 66 applied to voluntarily purchased liability
insurance policies. In Hughes v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.67 the issue was whether a family exclusion clause

contained in a voluntarily purchased insurance policy was valid. 68
The policy contained the standard post-1955 conformity clause,
which stated that the policy would conform to state law only if the
policy had been certified as proof of financial responsibility. 69 The
insured contended that the exclusion violated the public policy of
protecting innocent victims of financially irresponsible drivers as
61. See 48 Cal. 2d at 38, 307 P.2d at 363. For a discussion of the form of the 'standard-pre-1955
conformity clause and the reasons for its modification, see supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
62. See 48 Cal. 2d at 39, 307 P.2d at 364. The California Supreme Court determined that the
state's financial responsibility laws embody the policy of making owners of motor vehicles financially
responsible to people injured by them in the operation of their vehicles. Id.
63. See i. at 40, 307 P.2d at 365. In reliance upon the conformity clause, the court reasoned that
the policy provided "that the insurance afforded by the policy shall comply with the provisions of the
motor vehicle financial responsibility law ...." Id. (emphasis in original).
64. Id. at 37-40, 307 P.2d at 363-65. For the text of a typical omnibus statute, see supra note 31.
65. See 48 Cal. 2d at 40,307 P.2d at 365; see also Note, California FinancialResponsibiliD,Laws - A
Judicial Interpretation, 20 HAsT=Gs L.J. 1273, 1277-80 (1969) (criticizing judicial interpretation of
California's financial responsibility laws as being contrary to the apparent intent of the California
Legislature). The public policy enunciated in Wildman was the basis for later California decisions
holding various types of exclusionary clauses invalid because contrary to the public policy of
protecting innocent victims of traffic accidents from financial disaster. See, e.g., Pacific Indem. Co. v.
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 232 Cal. App. 2d 541, 543, 43 Cal. Rptr. 26, 27-28 (1965)
(excluding those who were not partners, employees, directors, or stockholders); Exchange Casualty
& Surety Co. v. Scott, 56 Cal. 2d 613, 622, 364 P.2d 833, 838-39, 15 Cal. Rptr. 897, 902-03 (1961)
(garage exclusion); American Auto Ins. Co. v. Republic Indem. Co., 52 Cal. 2d 507, 510-11, 341
P.2d 675, 676-77 (1959) (customer exclusion).
66. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-16.1-1l(2Xb), (3) (Supp. 1985). For the text of North Dakota's
imnibus statute, see supra note 31.
67. 236 N.W.2d 870 (N.D. 1975). Mrs. Hughes was injured while riding on a snowmobile with
the insured, Mr. Hughes. Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 N.W.2d 870, 874 (N.D.
1975). The insurance company denied liability on the basis of the family exclusion clause contained
in the voluntarily purchased recreational vehicle insurance policy. Id. at 875.
68. Id. The exclusion clause provided as follows: "This insurance does not apply .. . to bodily
injury to any insured or any member of the family of an insured residing in the same household as the
insured." Id. at 877.
69. Id. The conformity clause provided, in relevant part, as follows:
When certified as proof of future financial responsibility under any motor vehicle
financial responsibility law and while such proof is required during the policy period,
this policy shall comply with such law if applicable, to the extent of the coverage and
limits required thereby; but not in excess of the limits of liability stated in this policy.
Id. For a discussion of the form of the standard conformity clause and the reasons for its modification
in 1955, see supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
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expressed in North Dakota's financial responsibility laws. 7 0 The
court recognized the conflict among authorities regarding the
applicability of a state's financial responsibility laws to voluntarily
purchased liability insurance policies. 7 1 The court noted that the
difference between the minority and the majority viewpoints
72
seemed to be the particular court's public policy ideals.
In deciding to adopt the minority viewpoint, the court noted
that section 39-16-05 of the North Dakota Century Code explicitly
defined the re'quirements that a "liability insurance policy" must
provide to constitute proof of financial responsibility after an
individual's first accident.7 3 According to section 39-16-05 the
policy must provide "substantially the same coverage" as policies
issued pursuant to chapter 39-16.1 of the North Dakota Century
Code. 74 Chapter 39-16.1 requires policies issued pursuant to it to
contain an omnibus clause that operates to extend coverage to
persons using the insured vehicle with the consent of the owner,
and further provides coverage to the insured for any liability
resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle. 75 The court
determined that North Dakota's policy of protecting innocent
victims of traffic accidents from financially irresponsible drivers,
evidenced by the legislature's enactment of the financial
responsibility laws, compelled them to hold that all policies issued
pursuant to section 39-16-05 must contain the omnibus coverage of
chapter 39-16. 1.76 Otherwise, the court reasoned, the coverage
would not be" 'substantially the same" as coverage provided under
chapter 39-16.1.77
70. 236 N.W.2d at 880. The court noted that "[t]he basic purpose for the Legislature's
enactment of financial responsibility laws was to protect innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents
from financial disaster." Id. at 882. North Dakota's financial responsibility laws are contained in
chapters 39-16 and 39-16.1 of the North Dakota Century Code. See N.D. CENT. CooE chs. 39-16, 3916.1 (1980 & Supp. 1985). Section 39-16-05 of the North Dakota Century Code requires an
individual involved in certain accidents to establish that he or she is capable of responding to any
damages for which he or she may be found liable. Id. § 39-16-05 (Supp. 1985). The section gives the
State Highway Commissioner the power to suspend the individual's driving privileges if the section's
requirements are not fulfilled. See id. This sanction is inapplicable to an individual having an
acceptable liability insurance policy in effect at the time of the accident. See id. An acceptable policy is
one providing "substantially the same coverage" as policies issued under chapter 39-16.1. Id.
Section 39-16.1-11 sets forth the requirements that must be contained in policies issued under

chapter 39-16. 1. Id. § 39-16. 1-11.

71. 236 N.W.2d at 880. For a discussion of the conflict between authorities, see supra notes 34-56
and accompanying text.
72. 236 N.W.2d at 881. For a discussion of the minority and majority views, see supra notes 3456 and accompanying text.
73. 236 N.W.2d at 883; see N.D. CENT. CoEE § 39-16-05 (Supp. 1985). For the text of
subsection 2 of § 39-16-05, see supra note 27.
74. N.D. CENT. ConE 5 39-16-05 (Supp. 1985). Section 39-16.1-11 defines the coverage that
must be provided by policies certified as proof of financial responsibility. See id. S 39-16.1-11 (Supp.
1985).
75. Id. :i.- I I( I(2)(),
1
( ). For t t.xi o1 th se provisi(ns, s' scuipra n, c 31.
76. Hughes, 236 N.W.2d at 884-85.
77. Id. at 884. In Hughes the court cited.Jenkins v. Mayflower Ins. Exch., 93 Ariz. 287, 380 P.2d

418

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 62:407

In Shockley v. Sallows 78 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit considered whether the provision of North Dakota's
financial responsibility laws that renders an insurer's liability
absolute upon the occurrence of an accident causing injury or
damage applied to a voluntarily purchased automobile liability
insurance policy. 79 The court, applying North Dakota law,
interpreted Hughes as holding that all voluntarily purchased
automobile liability insurance policies that afford substantially the
same coverage as mandated by the state's financial responsibility
laws, are subject to the law's requirements. 0 Accordingly, the
court held that the insurer's liability became absolute upon the
occurrence of the accident, notwithstanding the insured's
misrepresentation of a material fact in the insurance application. 8 '
In Richard v. Fliflet 82 the dispositive issue was the applicability
of a provision of North Dakota's financial responsibility laws to an
insurance policy that had been purchased voluntarily and was not
certified as proof of financial responsibility.8 3 If the financial
responsibility provision was applicable, State Farm could not
rescind the policy on the basis of the material misrepresentation
made by the insured in the insurance application. 84 If the
provision were not applicable, State Farm would have been
8 5
justified in rescinding the policy.
145, while summarily dismissing the contention that there was a meaningful difference between the
terms "automobile liability policy" and "motor vehicle liability policy." Id. at 882-83. Compare
N.D.CENT. CODE 5 39-16-05(2) (Supp. 1985) (sanctions not applicable when driver of an automobile
is covered by an "automobile liability policy"); with id. § 39-16.1-11 (referring solely to a "motor
vehicle liability policy"). For a brief discussion of the relevance of the statutes' different terminology,
see supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.

The North Dakota Supreme Court also concluded that the conformity clause contained in the
insured's liability policy would have been "a sufficient basis on which to hold that such a clause does
indeed warrant that the policy in question, whether 'certified' or not, complies with any applicable
financial responsibility laws." 236 N.W.2d at 885 (emphasis in original). For a discussion of the
significance of a conformity clause, see supra notes 45-65 and accompanying text.
78. 615 F.2d 233 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980).
79. Shockley v. Sallows, 615 F.2d 233 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980).
Mrs. Shockley was killed in an automobile accident involving Sallows. Id. at 235. Mr. Shockely filed
a wrongful death action against Sallows and his insurer. Id. At trial, the jury found that Mr. Sallows
had concealed a material fact from the insurer and that the insurance policy was null and void. Id.
On appeal, Shockley argued that rescission of the insurance policy, after the occurrence of the
accident, was prohibited by I 39-16.1-11(6Xa) of the North Dakota Century Code. Id. For the text of
the statutory provision, see supra note 7.
80. 615 F.2d at 237. In Hughes the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the
"substantially the same coverage" language of § 39-16-05 requires all automobile liability insurance
policies to contain minimum limits of liability and to provide omnibus coverage. Hughes, 236
N.W.2d at 883.
81. Shockley, 615 F.2d at 237.
82. 370 N.W.2d 528 (N.D. 1985).
83. See id. at 530-31. At issue in Flifet was whether 5 39-16.1-11(6)(a) of the North Dakota

Century Code applies to voluntarily purchased, uncertified automobile insurance policies. See id.
Section 39-16.1-11(6)(a) prohibits an insurer from canceling motor vehicle liability policies after the

occurrence of injury or damage. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 39-16.1-11(6)(a) (Supp. 1985). For the text of
the statutory provision, see supra note 7.
84. See 370 N.W.2d at 530.

85. See id.
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Resolution of the issue required an interpretation of North
Dakota's financial responsibility laws in light of the judicial
constructions given these statutes in Hughes and Shockley. 8 6 The
court first stated that the financial responsibility laws were enacted
to protect innocent victims of traffic accidents from financial
disaster. 8 7 Second, the court noted that section 39-16-05 requires
an individual to have a liability insurance policy that affords
substantially the same coverage as mandated by chapter 39-16. 1.88
The court in Hughes had determined this to mean that all policies
must provide the omnibus coverage defined in subsections 2 and 3
of section 39-16.1-11 of the North Dakota Century Code. 89 The
court in Shockley had concluded that "substantially the same
coverage" required an insurer's liability to become absolute upon
the occurrence of injury or damage as provided in subsection 6 of
section 39-16.1-11. 90
The court in Fliflet agreed with the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals' interpretation of North Dakota law. 9 1 The court stated
several reasons for its decision. First, the court noted that North
Dakota has a compulsory liability insurance statute requiring all
drivers to carry insurance in the same amount as is required under
chapter 39-16.1 of the North Dakota Century Code. 92 Therefore,
all drivers in North Dakota must carry a liability insurance policy
that provides the coverage mandated under the financial
93
responsibility laws.
Second, the court placed considerable reliance on Hughes.94 In
Hughes the court determined that insurance policies purchased to
avoid the sanctions of section 39-16-0595 must contain the
minimum limits and omnibus coverage required by chapter 3986. Id. at 532-34. For a discussion of the Hughes and Shockley decisions, and their interpretation
of North Dakota's financial responsibility laws, see supra notes 67-81 and accompanying text.
87. 370 N.W.2d at 532.
88. Id. at 532. Section 39-16-05 of the North Dakota Century Code contains the requirement of
"substantially the same coverage." See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 39-16-05(2) (Supp. 1985). For the text of
the statutory provision, see supra note 27.
89. Hughes, 236 N.W.2d at 883.
90. Shockley, 615 F.2d at 237. The court in Shocklev noted that the insurer's defense.
misrepresentation by the insured in applying for the policy, was different from the exclusionary
clause defense advanced in Hughes. 615 F.2d at 237. Compare Hughes, 236 N.W.2d 870 with Shockley,
615 F.2d 233. The court concluded, however, that North Dakota's public policy and broad
interpretation of its financial responsibility laws dictated that the insurer's liability becomes absolute
upon the occurrence of the accident resulting in a death. 615 F.2d at 237.
91. Fliflet, 370 N.W.2d at 534.
92. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-08-20 (Supp. 1985) (the operation of a motor vehicle without
an insurance policy in effect that provides the same coverage as required by chapter 39-16.1 is a class
B misdemeanor).
93. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 39-08-20 (Supp. 1985).
94. See 370 N.W.2d at 532-33.
95. See N.D. Cent. Code S 39-16-05(l) (Supp. 1985). For the text of S 39-16-05(1), describing
the sanctions of the statute, see supra note 24. For the text of S 39-16-05(2), explaining how a driver

may avoid the sanctions, see supra note 27.

420

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 62:407

16. 1.96 The court in Fliflet also noted that the policy's conformity
clause operated to bring the policy into compliance with the
financial responsibility laws. 97 The court determined that if it
allowed the insurance company to rescind after the accident, the
coverage provided would not be "substantially the same coverage"
as provided under chapter 39-16.1.98 Therefore, the court held that
subsection 6(a) of section 39-16.1-11, which prohibits rescission of
an insurance policy after the occurrence of injury or damage,
applies to all voluntarily purchased automobile liability insurance
policies. 99
In Fliflet, the court expanded Hughes by making the
requirements of subsection 39-16.1-11(6)(a) applicable to all
policies of liability insurance issued in North Dakota, regardless of
whether the policy had been certified as proof of financial
responsibility. 10 0 The primary basis for both decisions was the
public policy of protecting innocent victims of traffic accidents from
financial disaster. 10 1 Although this policy is desirable, the decision
arguably penalizes the insurance company and allows the
wrongdoer to profit from his deception. 10 2 Justice VandeWalle, in
his dissenting opinion, criticized the court's decision. 10 3 He noted
that the misrepresentation in the insurance application was
intentionally made in order to qualify for a lower insurance
premium. 10 4 Justice VandeWalle stated that he doubted that the
legislature intended to "encourage the falsification of insurance
applications.'" 105
6. Hutghes, 236 N.W.2d at 884, 886. In order to satisfy chapter 39-16.1, a motor vehicle
liability policy must provide minimum coverage of $25,000 for an accident involving one injury or
death, $50,000 for two or more injuries or deaths, and $25,000 for property damage. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 39-16.1-11(2)(b) (Supp. 1985). In addition to these minimums, omnibus coverage isrequired. Id. S 39-16.1-11(2)(b). (3). For the text of North Dakota's omnibus provision, see supra
note 31.

97. 370 N.W.2d at 532-33. The conformity clause at issue in Fliflet was similar to the standard
modern conformity clause. For the text of the standard conformity clause, see supra note 47.
98. 370 N.W.2d at 535; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-16-05(2) (Supp. 1985) (providing that
voluntarily purchased liability insurance must provide substantially the same coverage as required
under chapter 39-16.1); id. S 39-16.1-11 (specifying coverage requirements for a motor vehicle

liability policy). For the text of S 39-16-05(2), see supra note 27.

99. 370 N.W.2d at 535. For the text of subsection 6(a) of S 39-16.1-11 of the North Dakota
Century Code, see supra note 7. Fliflet successfully argued that subsection 6(a) of S 39-16.1-11, which
makes the insurer's liability absolute after the occurrence of injury or damage, was essential to fulfill
the requirement that all persons must have insurance affording substantially the same coverage as
required under chapter 39-16.1. 370 N.W.2d at 535; see N.D. CENT. CODE, § 39-16-05 (Supp. 1985)
(providing that voluntarily purchased liability insurance must provide substantially the same

coverage as required under chapter 39-16.1).
100. Flflet, 370 N.W.2d at 535.
101. See id.

102. Id. at 536 (VandeWalle, J., dissenting). The insurance application was falsified by Lende
in an attempt to avoid paying the higher insurance premiums that would result if Bye had applied for
the insurance in his own name. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.

105. Id.
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Ultimately, this case was a dispute between insurance
companies. 0 6 Fliflet had an insurance policy in effect covering his
own vehicle. 10 7 Although his vehicle was not involved in the
accident, his insurance company provided him with a defense in
this case.10 8 Since the parties settled the case, with an agreement
that whichever insurance company was obligated to provide
coverage for the accident would pay Richard, neither Richard nor
Fliflet would have suffered any financial hardship as a result of the
accident. 109

The purpose of the financial responsibility laws is to protect
innocent traffic accident victims from financial disaster. 110 This
decision stretched the provisions of the financial responsibility laws
when there was no need to do so because neither party was in any
danger of financial loss."' As a result of this decision, insurance
companies will be exposed to added risk. Justice Pederson, in his
concurrence, noted that this added exposure may lead to higher
liability insurance premiums. 112

MELANIE KOPPERUD

106. Id.
107. Id. at 529-30.
108. Id. at 530.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 534. For a discussion of the purpose of financial responsibility laws, see supra notes
20-22 and accompanying text.
II1. er 370 N .W.2d at 536 (VandeWalle , dissenling).
2. Id. (Peclerson,.. . concurring specially). Justice Pedcrson co '0 rr'cd in the majority
opinion while expressing his personal view to the contrary. Id. at 535. Justice Pederson concurred
becase of his belief that "the law is expounded in majority opinions, not dissents." Id..at 536.

